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RIIO to REV: What U.S. Power 
Reform Should Learn from the 
U.K. 
 
By Heather Payne* 
 
“The problem we’re trying to solve is that we all 
know what the grid is supposed to look like.  It 
should be an integrated networked thing, that 
has the benefits of central station generation and 
transmission with the flexibility and innovation 
of distributed resources. . . . It’s not a question of 
the technology, it’s the fact that we have a 
regulatory structure and policies that aren’t 
building that system.  And so it’s a system which 
is capital inefficient, and it is not leading to a 
system that is built around the customer.”  
Richard Kauffman, New York Energy Czar1 
 
“Today, as we seek a new paradigm which relies on renewable 
resources, energy efficiency, demand response and other 
advanced technologies as intrinsic parts of the electric system, 
new rates and pricing structures must also be part of this 
transformation.”  Mina Morita, Hawaii’s PUC Chair, and 
Marco Mangelsdorf, Founder, Hawaii PV Coalition2 
 
* Assistant Director, Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and 
Resources (CLEAR) at the University of North Carolina School of Law; J.D., 
University of North Carolina School of Law; B.Ch.E., Georgia Institute of 
Technology.  I appreciate the useful comments provided by the participants of 
the Junior Environmental Scholars Workshop at the University of 
Washington School of Law.  Thanks to Shannon O’Neil for outstanding 
research assistance. 
1. Stephen Lacey, New York's Energy Czar on the Philosophy Behind the 
State's Energy Transformation, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 12, 2015), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-yorks-energy-czar-on-the-
philosophy-behind-new-york-transformation?utm_source=SmartGrid&utm_ 
medium=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily. 
2. Mina Morita was Hawaii's House Energy Chair from 1999 to 2011 and 
PUC Chair from 2011 to 2015.  Marco Mangelsdorf founded the Hawaii PV 
Coalition and is president of ProVision Solar.  Mina Morita & Marco 
1
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I.   Introduction 
 
Our current electricity economy is in a state of flux, from 
talk of a “death spiral” and customers abandoning the grid to 
utilities working to limit renewables and impose fixed fees, 
ostensibly for grid reliability and stability.  Regulatory reform 
to change how utilities generate power and interact with 
consumers is occurring all over the country, spurred by new 
economic realities, customers demanding choice, and federal 
rules.  U.S. regulators want a system that is reliable but 
promotes competition and other consumer benefits.  Many of 
these have been summed up as wanting a performance-based 
system rather than a capital-based system. 
These conversations will continue—and, in most cases, 
intensify—as states determine how they are going to address 
climate change and carbon regulations such as the EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan.  Absent, however, from most of these 
conversations is any suggestion of lessons learned from the new 
regulatory performance-based system adopted by the United 
Kingdom, RIIO.  RIIO, which stands for revenue = incentives + 
innovation + outputs, was designed to achieve many of the 
same goals as the regulatory reform currently underway in the 
United States.   
The lack of inclusion of RIIO in these conversations may be 
partly because of the newness of RIIO, the fact that it only 
applies to transmission and distribution in the U.K., or a lack 
of understanding among U.S. regulators about RIIO’s 
performance-based approach.  However, given the similarities 
in goals and desired outcomes, incorporating parts of the RIIO 
framework into the regulatory discussion in the United States 
could be especially helpful at this point in time. 
While most, if not all, regulatory schemes are complex in 
order to provide the best possible suite of incentives and to 
balance competing interests, RIIO’s structure even more than 
most defies easy, or quick, summarization.  Unfortunately, 
there is no already-existing summary of RIIO which is detailed 
 
Mangelsdorf, It's Time to End Net Energy Metering in Hawaii, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (July 6, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Its-Time-
to-End-Net-Energy-Metering-in-Hawaii?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium 
=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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enough to be useful but not so in-depth as to be boggling.  
However, understanding some of the nuance is necessary to 
effectively apply parts of the framework to state regulatory 
reform. 
Therefore, after discussing the recent history of and need 
for regulatory reform in the U.K., this article will summarize 
the RIIO framework and analyze the three parts best suited for 
import into the regulatory frameworks of American states.  
Specifically, the article will evaluate how a performance-based 
framework with (1) longer rate cases, (2) proportionate 
assessment, and (3) a focus on total expenditures limiting 
regulatory asset value, should positively influence the U.S. 
regulatory landscape.3  While RIIO is only used for 
transmission and distribution in the U.K., there is a potential 
for its performance-based approach to be used in generation as 
well as transmission and distribution in the U.S.  The article 
will discuss how RIIO could be applied across regulatory 
frameworks in the U.S. to vertically-integrated utilities as well 
as transmission and distribution networks.  As the initial 
impetus for looking at RIIO was determining how it could 
apply to New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) 
process, the article will conclude with a discussion of how the 
parts of RIIO highlighted are likely—or not—to be 
implemented as part of REV, based upon the New York Public 
Staff’s Track 2 white paper. 
 
II. U.K. Market Structure and Recent Regulatory Reform 
 
The U.K.’s electric and gas systems underwent significant 
changes, including privatization, in the 1990s.4  The end result 
 
3. As will be discussed later, typical rate cases in the United States are 
one to three years.  The United Kingdom had historically used five year rate 
cases, and are moving to eight year rate cases.  “Proportionate treatment” is 
the concept that the “degree of regulatory scrutiny” applied will change based 
on various inputs.  Strategy Decision for the RIIO-ED1 Electricity 
Distribution Price Control: Business Plans and Proportionate Treatment, 
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 4 (2013), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/47069/riioed1decbusinessplans.pdf. Limiting total expenditures 
and regulatory asset value are also discussed in more detail later in the 
paper.  See infra p. 56-57. 
4. Richard Pond, Liberalisation, Privatisation and Regulation in the UK 
Electricity Sector, WORKING LIVES RESEARCH INST. 1, 2 (2006), 
http://www.pique.at/reports/pubs/PIQUE_CountryReports_Electricity_UK_N
3
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was that generation is a competitive market, transmission and 
distribution consist of regulated monopoly businesses, and 
retail is a competitive market.5  Starting in 2008,6 the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (“Ofgem”) for the government of 
the United Kingdom, began a review of electricity generation 
and gas supply (Project Discovery) and the transmission and 
distribution networks used to deliver those utilities to 
consumers (RPI-X@20).  Ofgem’s authority covers the entire 
United Kingdom, so these analyses were done at a national 
level. 
 
A.    Project Discovery: Electricity Generation and Gas Supply 
 
“Project Discovery,” was a “year-long study of whether the 
current arrangements in [Great Britain were] adequate for 
delivering secure and sustainable electricity and gas supplies 
over the next 10-15 years.”7  Ofgem felt the study had to be 
conducted at that time due to new carbon targets, increasing 
exposure to the global natural gas market, the amount of 
investment needed, and the scheduled closure of aging 
generation plants.8  These are similar to what is driving 
regulatory reform in the United States currently. 
Project Discovery assessed the risks to generation and 
 
ovember2006.pdf. 
5. Structure of UK Electricity Industry, RWE NPOWER, http://www.rwe. 
com/web/cms/en/286414/rwe-npower/about-us/our-history/structure-of-
industry/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
6. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 46 (2010), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/51870/decision-doc.pdf; Regulating Energy Networks For the 
Future: RPI-X@20 Principles, Process and Issues, OFGEM.GOV, 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/regulating-energy-
networks-future-rpi-x20-principles-process-and-issues?docid=76&refer 
=Networks/rpix20/ConsultDocs (last visited Oct 1, 2015). 
7. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable 
Energy Supplies, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2010), https://www.of 
gem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40354/projectdiscoveryfebcondocfinal.pdf. 
8. Action Needed So Energy Supplies Remain Secure: Ofgem’s Project 
Discovery Findings, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2010), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/76124/discoveryfs.pdf; Ofgem 
Pushes on with Scrutiny of Security in GB Energy Supply, OFFICE OF GAS & 
ELEC. MKTS. 1, 1 (2009), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/40362/ 
discovery-status-report.pdf. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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supply using four scenarios,9 and in all growth and 
environmental commitment scenarios, the findings from the 
study were stark: “unprecedented” levels of investment were 
going to be necessary against a backdrop of increased risk and 
uncertainty; the lack of investment in low-carbon technologies 
would likely lead to greater costs to decrease carbon intensity 
in the future; spot market prices were not high enough to 
incent additional peaking capacity to be brought online; 
interdependence with other markets might undermine supply; 
and higher cost could affect consumer demand, which in turn 
could impact the competitiveness of business and industry.10 
To address these challenges, Ofgem developed five 
potential policy responses.11  These policy responses included 
(1) implementing targeted reforms, (2) enhanced obligations, 
(3) enhanced obligations plus renewables tenders, (4) capacity 
tenders, and (5) a central energy buyer.  However, each had 
drawbacks. 12 
 
9. The scenarios were: high growth/strong environmental commitment; 
low growth/strong environmental commitment; high growth/low 
environmental commitment; and low growth/low environmental commitment.  
Ofgem Publishes a Comprehensive Review of Britain’s Energy Supplies, 
OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 2 (2009), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/76390/ofgem-discovery-pr8-2.pdf. 
10. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable 
Energy Supplies, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. Targeted reforms would reduce carbon price uncertainty, improve 
price signals, and improve the ability for demand-side responses.  While 
Ofgem believed targeted reforms would increase incentives while retaining 
the benefits of a competitive market, there was concern that these might be 
insufficient to address the need for increased investment to secure supply.  
Especially with increased exposure to the worldwide natural gas market and 
recent political instabilities in gas-producing regions, the possibility of 
insufficient supply could negate the benefits of a competitive market.  An 
enhanced obligations policy—where there would be legal repercussions for 
companies who did not procure sufficient supply—would require suppliers to 
address the possibility of those threats.  However, this would require market 
participants to be responsible for supply security, which might be impacted 
by events beyond their control (like Russia cutting off supply to Europe), 
leading to a risk that this policy alone would also be insufficient to address 
the need for increased investment.  The enhanced obligations plus 
renewables tender policy had a similar benefit of requiring market 
participants to be responsible for supply, but added that industry was also 
responsible for ensuring that renewables targets were met more efficiently by 
offering a guaranteed return.  This increased certainty would be more likely 
to ensure that renewable targets would be met, but still had the risk of not 
addressing all investment challenges or ensuring that longer-term climate 
5
36 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:1 
After extensive public comment on the various proposed 
policy solutions, Ofgem determined that “significant action will 
be called for to deliver both security of supply and 
environmental objectives at affordable prices longer term[.]”13  
The most pressing issues with the current wholesale market 
included the strength of imbalance price signals,14 enabling 
distributed generation, interactions with other markets, 
available transmission, incentives for the incumbent system 
operator, and the need for other market reforms.15  While not 
as quickly implemented as those dealing with transmission and 
distribution, a review of electricity balancing arrangements 
was completed in May 2014,16 and a capacity market has been 
implemented, with rules going into effect in March 2015.17  
Reforms to address the other issues raised are under 
discussion.  None, however, is significant to regulatory reforms 
occurring in the United States. 
 
 
B. RPI-X@20: Electricity and Gas Transmission and 
 
goals would be met.  On the other hand, capacity tenders would be sufficient 
at accelerating investment, as the tender would include all forms of 
generation, gas storage, and other infrastructure projects.  However, this 
opened the customers to the highest amount of risk, as they would be 
responsible for “any poor decisions surrounding the type and scale of capacity 
required.”  The last option, considered the most “radical,” was to establish a 
central energy buyer, responsible for coordinating all future investment, 
similar to the situation when the utilities were nationalized.  While this 
policy would provide the greatest certainty, legal challenges were likely based 
on European Union law, customers were still at risk, and there was a fear 
that innovation would be stifled.  Action Needed so Energy Supplies Remain 
Secure: Ofgem’s Project Discovery Findings, supra note 8, at 3. 
13. Project Discovery: Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable 
Energy Supplies, supra note 7, at 1. 
14. Price signals for short-term imbalances on the grid can allow quicker 
and cheaper balancing; however, if the price signal is not strong enough, then 
the imbalance will not be rectified at the lowest cost.  Project Discovery: 
Options for Delivering Secure and Sustainable Energy Supplies, supra note 7, 
at 19. 
15. Id. at 19-21. 
16. Electricity Balancing Significant Code Review, OFGEM.GOV, 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-
review-and-reform/electricity-balancing-significant-code-review (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2015). 
17. Capacity Market (CM) Rules, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk 
/electricity/wholesale-market/market-efficiency-review-and-reform/electricity-
market-reform/capacity-market-cm-rules (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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Distribution 
 
While the review of the wholesale electricity generation 
and gas supply market was ongoing, a similar review was 
taking place for the electricity and gas transmission and 
distribution network framework.  Since privatization, the 
transmission and distribution networks had been regulated 
under a revenue control (what Ofgem termed “RPI-X”) 
framework.18  Similar to the challenges determined by Project 
Discovery for generation and supply, the main issues identified 
in the current RPI-X scheme were customer engagement, 
value, and the ability of the current network framework to 
adequately incorporate sustainable generation, low carbon 
sources, and social targets.19 
Ofgem’s proposed solution recommended a new regulatory 
framework based on twelve components.20  After extensive 
consultation and numerous comments, Ofgem adopted a new 
framework in October, 2010.21  This framework was termed the 
“RIIO model – Revenue set to deliver strong Incentives, 
Innovation and Outputs.”22  Ofgem adopted RIIO as the “new 
way to regulate energy networks.”23  While retaining some of 
the motivations behind and the structures of the regulatory 
regime set up during this initial privatization and 
liberalization of the energy sector, RIIO adjusts the focus of the 
 
18. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future: RPI-X@20 Principles, 
Process and Issues, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 17-20 (2009), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2009/02/principles-
processes-and-issues-con-doc_final---270209.pdf. 
19. Id. 
20. These components included maintaining the current industry 
structure including ex-ante control but requiring more consumer 
engagement, longer price controls (rate cases), and the option of third parties 
to play a greater role in delivery.  Additionally, rate cases would be outputs-
led with greater incentives.  Regulating Energy Networks for the Future: RPI-
X@20 Recommendations, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. (2010), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/51901/rpi-
xrecommendations.pdf [hereinafter Regulating Energy Networks for the 
Future]. 
21. Background — RPI-X@20 Review, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem. 
gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/background-rpi-x20-review (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2015). 
22. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3. 
23. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6. 
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regulatory framework for the electricity and gas transmission 
and distribution systems, 24 provides for competition, 
encourages innovation, and modifies the utility regulatory 
scheme in significant ways.25  A number of these could be 
beneficial if applied in the United States. 
 
III. RIIO 
 
Ofgem set a number of lofty goals for RIIO to accomplish.26  
However, it all boils down to delivering green energy to 
customers cheaply.27  Additionally, Ofgem wanted the new 
framework to be “more transparent, more accountable, more 
accessible and more proportionate.”28  Ofgem importantly 
recognized that the “nature, scale and location of demand” for 
 
24. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. 
MKTS. 1, 1 (2010), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/51871/riioha 
ndbook.pdf. 
In the U.K., these companies are referred to as electricity transmission 
owners, gas transmission owners, electricity distribution network operators, 
and gas distribution networks. Generation (supply) and the retail markets 
are regulated separately. Id. at 2. 
25. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 61-65. 
26. The stated goal of energy network regulation is generally to 
“encourage energy network companies to: play a full role in the delivery of a 
sustainable energy sector [and] deliver long-term value for money network 
services for existing and future consumers.”  RIIO: A New Way to Regulate 
Energy Networks: Final Decision, supra note 6, at 8.  Sustainability includes 
a low carbon footprint and other environmental objectives, secure supplies of 
energy, and meeting the needs of vulnerable customers.  See Handbook for 
Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 2. 
27. Customer engagement is a central consideration of RIIO, but that is 
outside the scope of this paper.  In the RIIO framework, the definition of a 
customer is more encompassing than what utilities typically regard as 
customers.  The definition includes “generators, shippers, interconnectors, 
independent network operators (IDNOs and IGTs), suppliers and energy 
service companies (ESCos)” as well as traditional business and home 
consumers. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 3.  
Because of the extensive focus on customers, there are significantly more 
engagement requirements, with the goal of demonstrating the impact of 
engagement throughout the regulatory process and evaluate whether and 
how the engagement was successful.  Ofgem set the expectation that network 
companies proactively engage with customers. Id. at 13-15.  If network 
companies consistently do not engage customers, Ofgem may place a license 
requirement that they demonstrate “thorough and ongoing engagement” and 
take enforcement action if the requirement isn’t met. Id. at 16 tbl.1. 
28. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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services are expected to change in the future.29  That is also 
true in the United States.  RIIO anticipates dealing with these 
changes through a detailed price control review process which 
sets outputs and other measures for a longer period of time. 
 
A.   Longer Rate Cases, Fewer Regulatory Reviews 
 
The RIIO framework is meant to fundamentally change 
the relationship between the regulator and the regulated 
companies.  It does this by changing what is measured and how 
long it is measured for.  Traditionally, regulation was focused 
on inputs.30  By focusing on outputs rather than inputs, the 
framework is designed to be more effective, leading to the 
ability for regulatory reviews to be less frequent.31  Also, as in 
the U.S., most network companies in the U.K. are focused on 
meeting challenges with additional infrastructure.  This 
infrastructure is then capitalized and added into the rate base.  
However, this is not always the best option for customers or the 
cheapest in the long term.  This additional certainty would 
consequently drive innovation and investment. 
A price control is similar to a rate case in the United 
States.  The default price control in RIIO—how long the 
parameters set during the price control review will be in 
place—is eight years,32 rather than the shorter time frame of 
five years now utilized.33  Even with prices set for longer 
periods, incentives are in place to allow for higher returns for 
innovative companies exceeding output goals.  As an incentive 
for companies to do well, those companies not meeting output 
requirements would see lower returns and more regulatory 
scrutiny.34 
 
 
29. Id. at 10. 
30. The State of New York Department of Public Service Staff provided a 
good overview of cost-of-service ratemaking and concerns with it.  SEE STAFF 
WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS, N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. No. 14-M-0101, at 16-21 (2015) . 
31. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 3. 
32. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 27. 
33. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 31. 
34. The lower returns would be achieved through cost-sharing 
mechanisms and asymmetrical incentives.  Id. at 3. 
9
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B.   Price Control Review Process 
 
The process that Ofgem uses to implement RIIO is 
important because it demonstrates both how the performance-
based outputs are determined and is also where Ofgem uses 
proportionate assessment.  Both of these should be used in 
regulatory frameworks in the United States. 
Ofgem has defined the detailed process to determine the 
rates that network companies can charge the public for their 
services.  The amount charged correlates to the amount of 
revenue they can expect to generate.  The price control review 
process is designed to take approximately 21-30 months to 
complete and is comprised of four stages.  The main actions 
taken at each stage are summarized in the following table. 
 
Stage Main Actions 
1 Ofgem: (1) defines outputs for the price control period; 
(2) determines methodologies for proportionate 
assessment and fast-tracking; and (3) codifies #1 and 
#2 in a consultation document. 
2 Network companies develop and submit business 
plans.  Ofgem reviews and determines level of 
proportionate assessment and decides on fast-
tracking (yes or no).  If yes, license conditions set and 
company moves to Stage 4. 
3 Network companies revise business plan based on 
Ofgem assessment in Stage 2. 
4 License conditions set; price control review complete. 
 
First, the Ofgem price control review team will determine 
outputs and the price control methodology.  At the end of Stage 
1, a consultation document will define the timetable for the 
price control review, outline key issues, establish outputs to be 
delivered during the next period, including the desired level of 
performance for those outputs, and other parameters.35  This 
 
35. The other parameters include efficiency and output incentives, 
inflation indexation, business plan requirements, the range of the estimated 
cost of capital, the length of control, and the use of uncertainty mechanisms.  
Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 9. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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document becomes an input for the network companies as they 
develop their business plans, which are submitted in Stage 2. 
Perhaps of most interest for the network companies, the 
document also lists the criteria which will determine the level 
of regulatory scrutiny (proportionate assessment).36  
Proportionate assessment—how strictly a company’s plan will 
be scrutinized and how quickly Ofgem will make a decision on 
the price control review—is based on “(a) the quality of the 
business plan submitted and (b) the network company’s 
performance in delivering outputs and value for money in 
previous periods.”37  Proportional assessment is designed to 
incent companies to deliver primary outputs well and submit 
good business plans.  By doing so, they will be required to 
spend less time in a regulatory process, enabling more time to 
be spent on the business.38 
The consultation document also details how the fast-track 
determination will be made.39  Fast tracking is Ofgem’s way of 
rewarding businesses with justified plans by accepting the plan 
with minimal review at Stage 2, essentially bypassing Stage 3 
and most of Stage 4. 
In Stage 2, network companies develop and submit their 
business plans.  A network company is to determine “what it 
intends to deliver for consumers of network services over time 
and what revenue it needs to earn from existing and future 
customers to ensure delivery is financed[,]” with the company 
being responsible for justifying all expenditures.40  Business 
plans must also “include reference to . . . the cost of capital they 
would require to ensure that the package was financeable.”41  
Also, to address the potential for network companies to 
gravitate toward infrastructure solutions, Ofgem will assess 
the extent to which a wide range of alternative, non-
infrastructure solutions have been proposed in the business 
plans.42 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 57. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 9. 
40. Id. at 47. 
41. Id. at 49. 
42. This includes a wide range of options for reliability. The range of 
options Ofgem mentions includes things such as pricing methodology and 
11
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Ofgem reviews the plans and then determines which 
companies will receive less regulatory scrutiny (proportionate 
assessment and fast tracking).43  Well-justified business plans44 
will likely have a final proposal come out of the price control 
review process closer to what the company requested.  On the 
other hand, those plans presented to Ofgem with less detail 
will likely be more heavily scrutinized and more likely to have 
other evidence applied to the plan.45  The assessment tools used 
by Ofgem to review business plans will also vary according to 
the level of regulatory scrutiny.46 
If a company is chosen for fast track at this point, all 
elements of a price control settlement will be drafted at this 
stage, including license changes.  The fast-tracked companies 
then move directly to Stage 4.47  A company which is not fast 
tracked moves to Stage 3.48  In Stage 3, companies submit 
revised business plans, addressing comments and concerns 
made by Ofgem during Stage 2.  Ofgem will develop a proposal, 
including license modifications, in Stage 4.49  This will be 
accomplished by Ofgem taking the business plans and other 
data provided by the network companies and applying the 
methodology published previously, using proportionate 
assessment.  After the proposal is submitted, the network 
companies must decide whether to agree to the proposed price 
 
access rule changes.  RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final 
Decision, supra note 6, at 13; see Open Letter from Stephen Smith, Managing 
Dir., Networks, to Suppliers, generators, customers and other interested 
parties (Aug. 4, 2009) (https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/44218/ 
impact-cdcm-and-dp5-distribution-charges-1-april-2010-customer-letter.pdf). 
43. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 10, 
58. 
44. Ofgem considers a “well-justified” business plan to demonstrate a 
focus on primary output delivery; consideration of secondary deliverables; a 
clear and well-evidenced case; an open minded consideration of available 
options; a link between costs and primary outputs; a consideration of the 
longer term; value for money; effective engagement with a range of 
stakeholders; and consideration of working with others.  Id. at 48-49. 
45. Other evidence could include benchmarking, information in other 
company’s business plans, and historical performance.  Id. at 55-56. 
46. These tools range from an “examination and reassessment of 
particular project plans” at the light end to “option to require companies to 
undertake further market testing” at the highest level of regulatory scrutiny.  
Id. at 63 fig. 21. 
47. Id. at 10. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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control package or seek judicial review.50  If agreed to, the 
proposal is final unless challenged by a third party.51 
 
C.   Base Revenue, Incentives, Innovation and Outputs 
 
Network companies, naturally, are interested in what 
Ofgem will let them charge customers.  At a high level, prices 
are set by Ofgem defining the outputs expected, and network 
companies creating and justifying plans to deliver these 
outputs, including revenue levels necessary to deliver 
efficiently.52  To put it more granularly, to determine what 
revenue network companies can expect (and will be allowed) 
during the price control period, three things are added 
together: (1) a baseline revenue allowance53 (expected efficient 
expenditure, asset value, capitalization, and weighted average 
cost of capital, among other things); (2) an amount based on 
rules to adjust revenues in light of a company’s performance, 
comprised of upfront efficiency incentives and 
rewards/penalties for delivery of outputs (the incentives and 
outputs piece or RIIO); and (3) an amount based on rules to 
adjust revenues for other factors, comprised of indexation and 
other uncertainty mechanisms.54  These, plus innovation, are 
explored in more detail. 
 
1.  Base Revenue 
 
Unlike the traditional cost of service regulatory approach 
employed in the United States,55 RIIO is a performance-based 
 
50. Id. at 11.  If they do not agree to the final control package, the case is 
referred to review by the Competition Commission.  The Competition 
Commission is independent and functions similarly to judicial review in the 
United States.  Id. at 20. 
51. There are only two grounds on which a modification request may be 
made: that the final proposal 1) operates against the public interest; or 2) 
may be expected to operate against the public interest.  However, third 
parties wanting to challenge any final proposal and settlement must also 
demonstrate that they have been effectively engaged throughout the price 
control review process.  Id. at 21. 
52. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 17. 
53. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 56. 
54. Id. at 29. 
55. JONATHON A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ENERGY REGULATION 67 (2007). 
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regulatory scheme with a regulated revenue allowance.  
Ofgem’s base revenue calculation starts with an “assessment of 
expected efficient costs required, during the eight-year control 
period, to deliver the primary outputs over time and to deliver 
long-term value for money.  The assessment of expected 
efficient costs . . . will be largely based on [Ofgem’s] assessment 
of the company’s business plan.”56 
Allowances for taxation, capitalization and depreciation 
will then be added to that expected efficient assessment.  Like 
most utility regulatory regimes,57  Ofgem’s assessment will 
incorporate a rate of return on asset value (“RAV”).58  The 
purpose of the allowed RAV is twofold: 1) to compensate 
investors; and 2) to provide value which facilitates investment 
in new infrastructure.59  However, when assets are added to a 
utility’s asset base, consumers pay RAV on them for the entire 
life of the asset—much longer than one rate control period.  
Therefore, to ensure network companies are not growing the 
asset base to increase revenues, RIIO focuses on total cost. 
The focus on “totex”60—total costs of delivery—rather than 
the specific cost categories of operational expenses (“opex”) and 
capital expenses (“capex”)61 will theoretically drive efficiency, 
with money being spent where it will most help deliver 
outputs.  Even with this overall measure being used and with 
well-justified business plans, however, Ofgem recognized the 
potential for delivery companies to inflate expenditures.62  To 
 
56. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 56. 
57. LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 55, at 44-45. 
58. Ofgem has committed to using “a real, weighted average cost of 
capital” (“WACC”) to set the rate of return allowed, with the cost of debt 
assumed in WACC based on a long-term trailing average, updated annually.  
Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 105, 108-09.  A 
capital asset pricing model will be used to determine the cost of equity fed 
into the WACC.  Id. 
59. Id. at 108. 
60. RIIO defines totex “the companies’ controllable costs which exclude 
business rates, license fees, pension’s contributions and shrinkage.”  RIIO-
GD1 Annual Report 2013-14, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 1, 41 n.24 (2015), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2015/03/riio-
gd1_annual_report_2013-14-final.pdf. 
61. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 64.  
Additionally, Ofgem plans to benchmark firms “based on the total costs of 
delivering the baseline performance level for primary outputs” during the 
business plan review.  Id. at 61. 
62. Unfortunately, Ofgem did not come up with a completely suitable 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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partially address this issue, Ofgem will set a fixed percentage 
of total expenditure that can be capitalized during the price 
control period.63  This will limit the amount that a company can 
add to its RAV.  This should also incent more efficient 
deployment of capital, as network companies should spend 
capital on initiatives that are most aligned to delivering the 
performance-driven outputs.  If network companies need to 
overspend capital to achieve an output, that capital essentially 
becomes the equivalent of opex (and does not get added into the 
asset base). 
“The fundamental economic goal of regulation is 
straightforward: to mimic a competitive market outcome, even 
when the underlying market is not competitive.”64  Ofgem hopes 
setting the totex expected efficient expenditure allowance, 
limiting the amount of totex that can be capitalized and, 
therefore, limiting the increase in asset base, will achieve that 
goal. 
 
2.  Incentives 
 
The incentives as part of the RIIO framework are designed 
to focus on output delivery performance, using “uncertainty 
mechanisms” where these add value for the customer, and 
“symmetric upfront efficiency incentive rate for all costs.”65  
The incentive portion is similar to cost sharing – if a network 
company found a way to deliver outputs at a lower cost, then it 
would earn higher profits but part of that benefit would be 
shared with consumers.  Likewise, if costs increased above 
what was expected, consumers would pay only a portion of 
those charges, and profits would decrease by the rest.66  
Specific incentives for delivery are set during the price control 
review process.67 
 
countermeasure.  Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, 
at 38. 
63. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 109. 
64. LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 55, at 17. 
65. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 3. 
66. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 41. 
67. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 74.  
Financial incentives will be used by Ofgem to incent delivery of outputs when 
“there is clarity on the primary outputs to be delivered; there is confidence in 
15
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In addition to financial incentives, Ofgem will set a “fixed 
and symmetric efficiency incentive rate” during each price 
control review.68  This is essentially designed as a risk-sharing 
mechanism, with the efficiency incentive rate as the “sharing 
factor.”69  The same rate applies to operating and capital 
expenditures.  Therefore, utilities are not being rewarded just 
for spending more capital.70 
Due to the long time frame and the fact that many of the 
inputs are based on assumptions, there will always be some 
uncertainty, both in revenue and primary output projections.71  
In addition to the efficiency incentive rate, Ofgem envisions 
three types of uncertainty mechanisms which allow revenue to 
change during the price control period, including some which 
will adjust automatically.72  Prices will be indexed to the retail 
 
the data used to measure performance; [Ofgem] consider[s] delivery of the 
primary output to be important; and there are not already incentives in place 
on the network company though other schemes or obligations.”  Id. at 76.  
What level of incentive – and, therefore, how strong of a market signal the 
incentive would send – will also depend on confidence in the accuracy and 
reliability of data.  Incentives are not uniform, but can vary by company.  Id. 
at 78.  Non-financial (reputational) incentives may be used when financial 
incentives are inappropriate for a particular output.  Id. at 79. 
68. This efficiency incentive rate is “a commitment to the way that the 
revenue that the company is allowed to collect adjusts upwards or 
downwards in light of what it actually spends during the price control 
period.” Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 83-84.  
“If the efficiency incentive rate is set at 40 per cent, the company’s investors 
will earn £40 profit (before tax) for each £100 that the company saves during 
the price control period and bear £40 of each additional £100 the company 
spends.  The remainder will be passed on to consumers through lower or 
higher network charges.”  Id. 
69. Id. at 84. 
70. The lower boundary of the rate is set by Ofgem at a level where it 
feels companies will have sufficient disincentive to overspend unnecessarily 
to increase the company’s regulatory asset value.  Id.  Adjustments based on 
the efficiency incentive rate will be made annually, but on a time lag to allow 
for audited data to be used.  The company may then charge customers based 
on the adjustments.  Id. at 87. 
71. Id. at 89. 
72. The three types of uncertainty mechanisms are: 1) uncertainty 
mechanisms fully-calibrated at the price control review (e.g., indexation, 
volume drivers, revenue triggers, and use it or lose it mechanisms) where no 
review is conducted and revenue adjustments occur automatically; 2) 
forward-looking revenue adjustment determined by Ofgem during the price 
control (e.g., revenue adjustment based on updated cost assessment if a 
trigger event occurs); and 3) revenue allowance determined after company 
incurs relevant expenditure (e.g., pass-through items, logging-up of actual 
expenditures subject to ex post efficiency review, and backward-looking 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
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price index, so prices will rise regularly during the price control 
period,73 and expenditures during the price control period will 
continue to be adjusted for inflation as they have been in the 
past.74 Aside from that automatic adjustment, an uncertainty 
mechanism will only be included if doing so provides value for 
consumers; no uncertainty mechanism will be included without 
a clear rationale.75Uncertainty mechanisms would also ideally 
“shield a network company entirely from the effects of rising 
and falling volume.”76 
Under RIIO, unlike the current state of affairs, third 
parties could be given control of large delivery projects, 
assuming these can be separated from the legacy company and 
where this would drive innovation and value.77  Interestingly, 
one of the potential issues this could create is uncertainty 
around legacy network company revenues.78  Comments 
received while RIIO was being developed indicated that the 
incumbent network companies “expressed concerns” about this 
potential.79  Essentially a disincentive, this proposal was 
primarily designed as a threat to ensure the companies with 
present licenses behave appropriately.80 
 
3.  Innovation 
 
Innovation is to be encouraged through incentives 
controlling price, the potential to give responsibility for 
 
revenue adjustment based on benchmarking analysis of outturn costs), with 
revenue adjusted after the magnitude of the expenditure is known.  Id. at 90-
92.  “Outturn” is defined by the Financial Times as “the actual amounts, 
results etc. at the end of a period of activity, rather than those that were 
expected or calculated earlier.”  Definition of Outturn, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=outturn (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
73. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 28. 
74. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 100.  
This is currently the retail prices index, and will continue to be the RPI.  
While some suggested a move to the consumer price index, Ofgem considered 
that unrealistic given that “corporate and government index-linked bonds 
continue to use RPI as the relevant index.”  Id. 
75. Id. at 95-96. 
76. Id. at 100. 
77. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 34. 
78. Id. at 38. 
79. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 34. 
80. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 40. 
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delivery to third parties, providing stimulus funds, and 
creating “prizes” for innovation in specific areas.81  Also in 
terms of innovation, the goal is to encourage both technological 
and commercial innovation.  While some innovation may be 
accomplished through the price control process or the 
involvement of third parties, innovations with a less clear path 
to commercialization may need additional funding.82  
Therefore, RIIO also includes an innovation stimulus, which is 
open to both network companies and non-network parties.83  
Non-network companies will be able to suggest and be awarded 
funding, and the expectation is that network companies will 
open their networks for testing and trials of new technologies.84 
 
4.  Outputs 
 
In the RIIO framework, outputs are set out in the utilities’ 
operating license, so consumers know what they are paying for.  
Outputs are designed to be “a comprehensive reflection of the 
outcomes that matter to the users of the network, as well as 
being material, controllable, measurable, comparable, 
applicable and legally compliant.”85  In determining which 
outputs will be measured, Ofgem established six categories: 
customer satisfaction, reliability and availability, safe network 
services, connection terms, environmental impact, and social 
obligations.86  For each primary output (and any secondary 
deliverables), Ofgem will determine the base level that 
 
81. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 3. 
82. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 51-52. 
83. However, non-network parties would need to have a license to 
participate in the program.  Id. at 125-26.  The stimulus innovation package 
“will provide partial funding for innovation projects that relate to the 
provision of network services and have as their intent delivery of a 
sustainable energy sector."  Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, 
supra note 24, at 128.  Any stage of innovation is eligible for funding, from 
basic research and development to pilot projects, with projects chosen 
through a competitive grant process.  Id. at 123.  See generally Network 
Innovation, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/distribution-
networks/network-innovation (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
84. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 127-
28. 
85. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 22. 
86. Id. at 21. 
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companies are expected to meet during each price control.87 
For customer satisfaction, reliability and availability, and 
conditions for connection, the primary outputs should 
demonstrate delivered service level and “relate to the service 
for consumers and network users.”88  For environmental 
impact, the primary outputs should demonstrate the impact on 
environmental targets.  For social obligations and safety, the 
primary outputs should show compliance with legislation.89  
Performance levels for primary outputs can be expressed either 
as a percent change or an absolute number.90  These outputs 
are then inserted into the company’s license as a condition.91 
How companies are doing in relation to these metrics are 
published annually, primarily to incent consistent action on the 
basis of reputation and the possibility of it becoming 
tarnished.92  Additionally, a balanced scorecard with all 
outputs will be developed for each network sector, enabling 
comparison between companies.93  These outputs and 
deliverables will remain in place for the entire eight-year 
period, and potentially much longer.94  What these primary 
outputs and secondary deliverables 95 are, will directly impact 
the price allowed to be charged during the price control review 
 
87. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 24. 
88. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 34. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 46. 
91. Id. at 81. 
92. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 40. 
93. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 80. 
94. Id. at 32. 
95. Secondary deliverables are envisioned to manage network risk, 
provide the means for delivering primary outputs in the future, and allow for 
technical and commercial innovation projects.  Therefore, one of the main 
purposes of secondary deliverables are to give network companies the ability 
to invest more during this price control period than what is necessary for 
simply meeting primary outputs.  As such, they are likely to be intermediate 
outputs, as there must be some measure to hold network companies 
accountable.  To aid in accountability, secondary deliverables should focus on 
what the “means to the end” is, rather than pertain to a specific method of 
delivering that end.  However, this additional investment will only be allowed 
to occur where the business plan shows benefit over the long term during 
future price control periods.  Including secondary deliverables is not a 
foregone conclusion; they will only be included when there is a clear and 
credible case for including one due to the added administrative burden.  And 
whatever secondary deliverables are agreed upon, network companies are 
still required to meet all primary outputs.  Id. at 39-40, 43-45. 
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period, as these are what the network companies’ business 
plans must be designed to deliver.96 
The specific outputs—and how companies are meeting 
them—also provide an opportunity for customer engagement.  
Knowing these outputs in advance also ensures that there are 
incentives for companies to deliver.97 
 
D.   Mid-period reviews / potential for change 
 
Ofgem also expects RIIO to adapt; following price control 
reviews, summary documents will be published which will 
include lessons learned.98  Standardized data collection will 
continue and will aid in benchmarking.99  Additionally, RIIO is 
designed with one mid-period review to occur during the fourth 
year of the price control period and to take effect at the 
beginning of the fifth.  A mid-term review, while standard, is 
very limited in scope and would “only result in changes to 
revenue where requirements on the network companies change 
significantly.”100 
Changes made during the mid-period review will heavily 
depend on whether primary outputs need to change.101  If they 
do, Ofgem acknowledges that revenues may also need to be 
adjusted, but “[a]ny changes to allowed revenues will focus on 
the incremental impact on expenditure requirements from the 
specific change to outputs, without re-opening the whole price 
control.”102  Items outside that limited scope will be managed in 
 
96. Id. at 32. 
97. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 3. 
98. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 12. 
99. Id. 
100. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 32.  
The scope of the mid-period review will clearly be defined in the price control 
review process and set out in the license conditions, but would not include a 
review of past expenditures, financial assumptions, or incentive 
arrangements.  Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, 
at 28.  Incentive mechanisms, rate of return, or other parameters would not 
change unless forced to do so by output changes.  RIIO: A New Way to 
Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, supra note 6, at 27. 
101. The limited scope is necessary to ensure that the incentive signals 
function appropriately.  Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra 
note 24, at 93. 
102. Id. 
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other ways, including incentives. 
 
E.   Implementation 
 
Importantly, Ofgem concluded that RIIO could be 
effectively implemented “under the existing industry 
structure,”103 and was first used to set prices for 
transmission104 and gas distribution105 in 2013 and electricity 
distribution in 2015.106 
For the gas distribution network price control, which sets 
the revenues gas distribution network (“GDN”) companies can 
recover and the outputs they will deliver between April 1, 2013, 
and March 31, 2021, no network company was fast-tracked, 
although Ofgem did note that the business plans were 
generally of higher quality than they had received in the 
past.107  Ofgem clearly identified expected outputs: 
 
[W]e expect GDNs to reduce the safety risk by 
40-60 per cent during RIIO-GD1. We also expect 
GDNs to reduce gas transport losses, which 
comprise 95 per cent of GDNs’ carbon footprint, 
by 15 to 20 per cent by the end of the period. . . .  
[W]e will require GDNs for the first time to 
deliver an improvement in the public awareness 
of the risks of carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning, a 
key gas safety issue. We will publish an 
assessment of GDNs’ comparative performance.  
We will also require GDNs to connect around 
80,000 fuel poor customers to the gas network 
over the price control period. 
 
We will require the GDNs to deliver 
 
103. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 13. 
104. RIIO-T1 Price Control, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ 
network-regulation-riio-model/riio-t1-price-control (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
105. Id. 
106. RIIO: A New Way to Regulate Energy Networks: Final Decision, 
supra note 6, at 4; RIIO-T1 Price Control, supra note 104. 
107. RIIO-GD1: Final Proposals-Overview, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 
1, 7-8 (2012), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/48154/1riiogd1f 
poverviewdec12.pdf. 
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improvements in customer services.  We have set 
out a financial incentive mechanism to reward 
(or penalise) their performance.  Overall, GDNs 
will need to improve customer satisfaction from 
current levels to the upper quartile GDN 
performance to avoid a penalty and earn a 
reward. We are also confirming standards for 
connecting new customers to their network, as 
well as our intention to develop voluntary 
standards for biomethane connections. 
 
Finally, our reliability output measures will 
require GDNs to maintain the integrity of 
network assets, as well as meet the current 
network capacity and security of supply 
standards.108 
 
Ofgem’s goal is to maintain the efficiency incentive rate was 
around 50% for all sectors.109  At 50%, any cost overruns would 
be split between customers and investors evenly.  The same 
would be true for any cost savings.  For this gas price control 
period, while it varies by company, the range is 62-64%.110  On 
the innovation side, Ofgem requested network companies 
submit innovation strategies, which could be funded with 
between 0.5% and 1% of overall revenue.  At final settlement, 
the Network Innovation Allowances ranged from 0.5% for those 
plans Ofgem felt performed poorly against their assessment 
criteria to 0.7% for those strategies that were better justified.111  
In terms of uncertainty mechanisms, in addition to the 
automatic annual indexation change,112 Ofgem is allowing 
revenue discussions to be reopened for smart metering cost 
recovery.113 
 
108. Id. at 4-5; See generally RIIO-GDI: Final Proposals - Supporting 
Document - Outputs, incentives and innovation, OFFICE OF GAS & ELEC. MKTS. 
(2012), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/48155/2riiogd1fpout 
putsincentivesdec12.pdf. 
109. RIIO-GD1: Final Proposals-Overview, supra note 107, at 11. 
110. Id. at 29. 
111. Id. at 21-22. 
112. Id. at 33. 
113. Id. at 31.  Ofgem will also allow GDNs to request reopening if 
“uncertain costs” climb to a pre-set cumulative cap.  Id. at 32. 
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On the financial side, the weighted actual cost of capital 
was set at 4.2%.  Ofgem re-committed that well-performing 
network companies “can earn post-tax real double-digit returns 
on (notional) equity, and GDNs who perform poorly would be 
exposed to returns at or below the cost of debt.”114 
The first annual summary report detailing outcomes under 
the gas distribution price control was issued by Ofgem in 
March, 2015.115  Ofgem noted that “[t]here are a few specific 
outputs within the safety and reliability output commitments 
that need attention because the required level in the first year 
hasn’t been met or is forecast to fall short over the RIIO-GD1 
period.”116  For safety, the output not being met is repair risk; 
for reliability, the issues relate to supply interruptions.117  One 
GDN is not meeting customer survey targets for connection and 
planned interruption surveys and was penalized using the 
incentive mechanism.118  All other primary outputs are being 
met.119 
Forecasting performance over the entire eight-year price 
control period, GDNs expect their actual costs will be 11% 
below the allowance set by Ofgem, with investors reaping 64% 
of those savings and customers 36% through the ratios set in 
the efficiency incentive.120  Returns on regulated equity are 
expected to be between 8.9% and 11.8% over the period, 
assuming all GDNs deliver outputs at the required level for the 
entire period.121  No claims under uncertainty mechanisms 
were made during the first year.122  Overall, Ofgem expects the 
gas distribution component of an average annual consumer’s 
bill will decrease by almost £1 per year over the eight year 
price control period.123 
As it may be the one most applicable to the regulatory 
changes occurring in the United States, looking at the 
 
114. Id. at 38. 
115. RIIO-GD1 Annual Report 2013-14, supra note 60 at 6. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 6, 28. 
119. Id. at 16-38. 
120. Id. at 7. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 45. 
123. Id. at 7. 
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electricity distribution price control could be most instructive.  
One electricity distribution network company, Western Power 
Distribution, was fast-tracked, and had its license conditions 
issued in May, 2014.  The remaining network companies 
received their license conditions implementing Ofgem’s final 
determinations in February 2015.124  Unfortunately, as this is 
the last group of network companies to implement RIIO, no 
data are yet available.125 
 
IV.   How RIIO Should Inform the U.S. 
 
The U.K. and many systems in the U.S. have the same 
goals, and the same challenges.  Goals include delivering a low 
carbon economy, with smarter networks, customer choice, at a 
lower cost to the consumer.  Shared challenges are the 
increased use of distributed generation, extending high voltage 
transmission lines to move energy from utility-scale renewable 
generation to load centers, and an increase in intermittent 
generation.126  All of these suggest a move toward performance-
based regulation. 
 
A.   Regulatory Frameworks in the United States 
 
In order to analyze if RIIO could be applicable in the 
United States, it is useful to look at the regulatory frameworks 
employed by various states.  At a high level, most regulatory 
frameworks fall into one of two categories: vertically integrated 
or deregulated. 
In a fully regulated/vertically integrated utility model, the 
utility is responsible for generation, transmission and 
distribution, and the retail functions for consumers within a 
specific service territory.  The utility often owns many of the 
generation assets and the transmission and distribution lines.  
There is no choice for the retail consumer.  North Carolina, 
 
124. RIIO-ED1 Price Control, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/net 
work-regulation-riio-model/riio-ed1-price-control (last visited Oct. 1 2015). 
125. Network Performance Under RIIO, OFGEM.GOV, https://www.ofgem. 
gov.uk//network-regulation-riio-model/network-performance-under-riio (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2015).  Ofgem expects to publish performance information and 
data after the first year of operation of the price control.  Id. 
126. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 51. 
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South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Colorado are 
examples of where utilities are still vertically integrated. 
In a deregulated market, a grid operator manages the 
wholesale market for generation.  A regulated utility handles 
the transmission and distribution.  Customers can choose their 
supplier, who purchases generation on the wholesale market 
and then sells it to those consumers with whom that supplier 
has a contract.  This enables consumers, if they choose, to 
specialize their utility offering.  For example, customers can 
determine what mix of generation assets they want producing 
their energy, such as 100% solar or 100% renewables.  
Consumers can also opt for suppliers which offer cheaper rates 
at night and on the weekends or other time-of-use options.  
New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Texas are all 
deregulated markets. 
 
B.   Applying RIIO 
 
Parts of RIIO should be applied to both frameworks.  While 
RIIO only applies to transmission and distribution in the U.K., 
there is no reason why RIIO’s solutions should not apply to 
generation as well as transmission and distribution in the U.S 
since both face similar issues.Specifically, the adoption of 
longer rate cases, proportionate assessment, and a focus on 
total expenditures limiting regulatory asset value should be 
applied in each model. 
Under RIIO, rate cases are set for eight years, rather than 
the one to three years common in the United States 
currently.127  However, just because a long rate-case period 
occurs, that does not mean utilities can simply continue to 
operate without risk of regulatory action for that period of 
time.  All have performance targets, and those targets can 
come with automatic penalties for failure to meet them.  
 
127. New York’s REV process is looking at length of rate cases, and 
California is actively exploring rate reform, including duration, but it doesn’t 
appear either is looking at a period as long as eight years.  California’s 
current timing is for a generate rate case to occur every three years.  Jeff St. 
John, Inside SoCal Edison's Plan to Open Its Grid to Distributed Energy, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 1, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles 
/read/inside-socal-edisons-plan-to-open-its-grid-to-distributed-energy?utm 
_source=Storage&utm_medium=Headline&utm_campaign=GTMDaily. 
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Annual reports summarize how all companies within that 
sector are performing against target, with call-outs for which 
metrics are not being met now and which ones may not be met 
in future years.  Mid-year reviews ensure that network 
companies are working efficiently and meeting targets. 
Utilities are punished for lack of performance, as they can have 
revenues decreased annually based on incentive penalties for 
not meeting outputs.  If the poor performance or inefficiency 
continues, they endure more intrusive and heavy-handed 
regulation along with lower returns.  Importantly, in RIIO, 
poorly performing or inefficient utilities “could see rates of 
return below the cost of debt.”128  This potential does not exist 
currently for regulated utilities in the United States.  It should. 
This output- and metric-driven performance-based 
structure unites well with the theory of proportionate 
treatment,129 where companies are scrutinized during rate 
cases and other regulatory proceedings based on how well they 
have met expectations, including how efficiently they have 
spent ratepayer funds in the past.  This does several things.  
First, it incents utilities to provide good information, deliver 
the outputs promised, including safety, health, and 
environmental goals, and provide improved customer service.  
Second, it rewards these companies by decreasing their 
regulatory burden, freeing them to spend more time running 
their business and continuing to improve outputs.130 
Incorporating this idea of proportionate treatment into 
U.S. regulatory reform for both generation and transmission 
and distribution would provide the same benefits.  Rather than 
all utilities going through the same integrated resource plan 
(IRP) process, for example, well-justified, customer- and 
efficiency-centric plans which also met safety, health and 
 
128. Regulating Energy Networks for the Future, supra note 20, at 47. 
129. Handbook for Implementing the RIIO Model, supra note 24, at 61. 
130. Incidentally, this is similar to a situation my father, Edwin Simon, 
a former U.S. Marine, told about basic training.  The unit with the best daily 
performance did not have to work at kitchen duty the next day.  Once his unit 
achieved the best daily performance, they spent the time everyone else was 
doing kitchen duty the next day doing extra drills, to ensure that they were 
the best that day as well, and, therefore, did not have to do kitchen duty the 
next day either.  This continued daily for the rest of basic training, ensuring 
the unit never had to do kitchen duty. Rather than spending their time on 
administrative issues, they focused instead on increasing performance. 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/2
2015 RIIO TO REV 57 
environmental goals could be subject to a fast-track mechanism 
with less regulatory scrutiny.  For rate cases and distribution 
resource plans, the same could be true.  Utilities that submit 
cases or plans which fall short of public expectations around 
service, environmental management, and cost controls would 
be subject to more scrutiny and, therefore, a higher 
administrative and regulatory burden.  Additionally, Ofgem 
and many states have already decoupled energy sales from 
utility profits directly; however, all are dealing with the similar 
constraints that utilities have a profit motive to expand capital 
investments, since each still includes a rate of return on assets 
in transmission and distribution utility profits.131  The same is 
true for generation assets in vertically integrated utilities.  
Focusing on total expenditures, rather than either on 
operational expenses or capital expenses, is one way for 
regulators to manage these long-lasting costs to ratepayers.  
Limiting—as a percentage—the amount of total expenditures 
utilities can add to regulatory asset value and using a real 
weighted average cost of capital could ensure utilities are not 
making unnecessary capital investments, locking consumers 
into paying for unnecessary equipment in rate cases for 
decades to come.  The potential for this long-term asset 
padding is something regulators may need to be especially 
mindful of as regulatory incentives and frameworks change.132 
 
131. Bentham Paulos, Regulating the Utility of the Future: Implications 
for the Grid Edge, GREENTECH MEDIA  (Jan. 2015), 1, 14 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/report/regulating-the-utility-of-the-
future. 
132. For example, ComEd is planning on spending $2.6 billion over 10 
years on infrastructure, which will be added into the rate base.  Jeffrey 
Tomich, ComEd CEO Pramaggiore: 'Network Economies Rule', ENERGYWIRE 
(July 23, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/07/23/stories/10600 
22279.  SoCal Edison is planning on spending $347-560 million between 2015 
and 2017, and then an additional $1.4-2.585 billion between 2018 and 2020.  
Jeff St. John, California’s Distributed Energy Grid Plans: The Next Steps, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 7, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/ 
read/californias-distributed-energy-grid-plans-the-next-
steps?utm_source=Solar&utm_medium=Picture&utm_campaign=GTMDaily.  
Even Duke Energy, operating where there is no push to deregulate, is putting 
more equipment into the capital base than is currently needed: “We’re going 
to build headroom into our systems, today and into the future[.]”  Jeff St. 
John, The Big Picture from Grid Edge Live 2015, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 29, 
2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-big-picture-from-
grid-edge-live-2015. 
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Having an annual scorecard between all companies in a 
sector adds to transparency, increasing customer trust.  This is 
clearly possible in deregulated markets, where potentially 
numerous companies exist under the purview of a single 
regulator.  New York’s transmission and distribution utilities 
are an example of this.  However, in places like North Carolina 
where there is essentially a single, vertically integrated utility, 
a state-level scorecard comparison would be meaningless.  
However, benchmarking across state lines is still possible.  
While this may be more complicated due to state-level control, 
it is possible for state regulators to work together to require 
even vertically integrated utilities to submit figures calculated 
in the same manner and including the same information.  That 
way, they, as regulators, could have better data with which to 
assess their utilities. 
 
V. Regulatory Reform Currently Underway in the U.S.: New 
York As A Case Study 
 
States within the U.S. are grappling with some of the same 
challenges identified by Ofgem: how to adapt the regulatory 
structure to incorporate low carbon generation, enabling 
transmission investment, and doing both while maintaining 
affordability and reliability.  New York’s Reforming the Energy 
Vision (“REV”) process is especially insightful as to where 
RIIO’s concepts could be applied, as New York has the same 
regulatory structure as the United Kingdom: competitive 
wholesale generation, regulated monopoly transmission and 
distribution, and competitive retail.  This section will therefore 
discuss REV and the extent to which it does – or does not – 
learn from RIIO’s example. 
New York is currently undergoing, arguably, the largest 
structured rate reform process in the United States, and, like 
RIIO, it’s turning out to be very complex.133  REV will look at 
both incentives used in setting rates, including “input versus 
 
133. Katherine Tweed, Wants Versus Needs: The Struggle to Realize New 
York's Energy Vision, GREENTECH MEDIA (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wants-vs.-needs-the-struggle-
to-realize-new-yorks-energy-vision?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium=Head 
line&utm_campaign=GTMDaily. 
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outcome-based ratemaking,” and rate design.134  The goal is “to 
create excellent, innovative companies.”135  Similar to RIIO, 
REV has six policy goals: enhanced customer knowledge136 and 
tools that will support effective management of their total 
energy bill; market animation and leverage of ratepayer 
contributions; system-wide efficiency; fuel and resource 
diversity; system reliability and resiliency; and reduction of 
carbon emissions.137 
Of course, the biggest change proposed in REV is the 
creation of distributed system platform providers (“DSP”) to 
manage electricity flows on the grid, sitting between the 
wholesale market, retailers, third-party providers and 
customers.  Traditional utilities—at least initially—will fulfill 
the role of the DSP, but plenty of questions remain, especially 
around data and customer management, rate and market 
structure, incentives, and cost. 
The public service staff did acknowledge RIIO in the 
original REV scoping document.138  Staff favorably noted the 
extended eight-year term, a focus on outcomes, and the totex 
approach.139  However, they expressed doubt about 
implementing much of RIIO due to potential issues with 
 
134. REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. No. 
14-M-0101, at 51-52 (2014). 
135. Paulos, supra note 131, at 62. 
136. In discussing REV with the public, staff starts with the mission of 
providing affordable, safe, secure and reliable access across utility sectors 
while protecting the environment.  Focusing on the customer experience, staff 
acknowledges electricity and information currently flows in one direction 
only, from the utility to the consumer, with information only on a monthly 
basis, and with electricity provided on aging infrastructure.  With increasing 
bills, customers are worried about affordability, reliability and resiliency, 
while the current regulatory framework produces disincentives around 
innovation and the development of new technologies.  Staff stresses that new 
technology will provide customer opportunities in distributed generation, 
reducing the need for infrastructure investment, will improve efficiency, and 
enable a new marketplace for consumer options.  While referencing the 
proposed market structure, the materials focus on enabling customer 
participation and that customers will get paid as electricity producers.  
Reforming the Energy Vision: What it Means to Energy Consumers, N.Y. 
STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. (2015), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/ 
96f0fec0b45a3c6485257688006a701a/26be8a93967e604785257cc40066b91a/$
FILE/88708408.pdf/NEW%20REV%20FEB%202015.pdf. 
137. Paulos, supra note 131, at 62. 
138. REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, supra note 134, at 54-56. 
139. Id. at 55. 
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benchmarking and the belief that that benchmarking would be 
necessary to implement RIIO’s ratemaking structure.140  
However, the difference between rural, upstate New York and 
Manhattan is similar to the difference between rural Scotland 
and central London.  Public staff did not comment on 
proportionality. 
Those responding to the public staff document, however, 
were more complementary, noting that REV should “reward 
results, not utility spending.”141  At least some of these 
comments seem to have swayed public staff; the white paper on 
ratemaking and utility business models was much more 
favorable toward concepts included in RIIO than would have 
been expected from previous documents. 
Public staff acknowledged that “[u]tilities’ earnings are 
heavily dependent on their capital expenditures,” and that 
integrating increasing levels of renewables may require 
increases in operating expenses and decreases in capital 
expenses.142  As decreasing capital expenses will decrease the 
asset rate base, leading to longer-term lower returns, there are 
currently financial incentives for the utility to maintain capital 
spending.143  Public staff recognized that “[t]he conventional 
rate treatment of utility capital and expenses is in conflict with 
a reformed energy vision” and that “any structural financial 
incentive embedded in regulation for a utility to favor its own 
capital spending” must be eliminated.144 
While public staff recognized that the “totex” approach had 
been employed by RIIO to “make the utility somewhat 
indifferent to the type of expenditure,” and noting that REV 
shared the same goal, public staff dismissed the totex approach 
 
140. Id. at 55-56. 
141. Email from Elizabeth B. Stein, Environmental Defense Fund, to 
Honorable Kathleen H. Burgess (July 18, 2014) (http://blogs.edf.org/energy 
exchange/files/2014/07/EDF-Track-2-REV-Comments.pdf) (Re: Comments on 
Case 14-M-0101 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to 
Reforming the Energy Vision).  
142. STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS, 
supra note 30, at 3.  “Unlike competitive companies whose long-term increase 
in profitability is driven by growing revenues and controlling costs, utilities’ 
earnings are largely a function of increasing investment and controlling 
short-term expenses.”  Id. at 22. 
143. Id. at 39 (“Thus, utilities have inherent interests in growing rate 
base through capital expenditures.”). 
144. Id. at 23. 
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as too complicated for accounting reasons and requested that 
stakeholders suggest other approaches that could be used.145  
However, rather than invent something new, it seems that the 
totex approach does meet the goal of limiting the amount of 
capital added into the rate base and could still be used.  Using 
totex, it is possible that the amount of capital included in a rate 
base would be different from the amount of capital included on 
a GAAP balance sheet.  However, as the amount included in 
the rate base is not a public financial statement, the amount of 
capital in each would not need to be reconciled.  Having two 
standards would result in a higher administrative burden, but 
certainly seems possible to meet an objective which public staff 
has not found another way to achieve. 
Public staff also recommended that more performance- or 
output-based metrics be included in rate cases,146 “such that 
utility earnings are based on performance and achievement of 
outcomes rather than almost entirely on capital spending.”147  
They are seen “as an opportunity to increase earnings without 
adding to base rates.”148  However, for three of the initial five 
“earnings impact mechanisms” (“EIMs”), the recommendation 
is to only allow for positive incentives, allowing these to be 
mechanisms only to increase utility revenues.149 
Like RIIO, the public staff also recommends standardized 
metrics, with the “method of measuring performance . . . 
uniform across utilities.”150  Much longer than the current list 
that would affect earnings,151 these “should be used for 
 
145. Id. at 43-44. 
146. “New approaches that are tied to successfully driving desired 
outcomes, including greater use of performance incentives, should be 
initiated and applied to a range of policy objectives built around market, 
customer, and environmental goals.”  Id. at 9. 
147. Id. at 29. 
148. Id. at 31. 
149. Id. at 54.  The five proposed categories are peak reduction, energy 
efficiency, customer engagement and information access, affordability, and 
interconnection.  Id. at 55-59.  Public staff recommended that the EIMs for 
data access and interconnection have some potential negative adjustment, as 
these are mainly within the control of the utility.  Id. at 61. 
150. Id. at 60. 
151. The list includes: system utilization and efficiency; DG, energy 
efficiency, and dynamic load management (DLM) penetration; opt-in time-of-
use rate efficacy; market development; MBE use; carbon reduction; customer 
satisfaction; customer enhancement; and conversion of fossil-fueled end uses.  
Id. at 64-66. 
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planning, transparency, and accountability,”152 but will have no 
direct impact on revenues.  Thus, RIIO’s concept of 
benchmarking does appear like it will be adopted, at least in 
some form. 
RIIO’s process—and with it, proportionate assessment and 
longer rate cases—was clear in its goals of providing regulatory 
certainty and the ability of network companies to focus on the 
business.  The public staff recommendations seem to suggest 
similar goals,153 but have provided none of the regulatory 
clarity or certainty necessary to achieve these objectives.  For 
example, the public staff has recommended that the standard 
rate case be maintained at three years, but with the potential 
for that to be extended for an additional two for “high-
performing utilities.”154  Additionally, the public staff 
recommends that “[m]any EIMs should be established on a 
multi-year basis,”155 as occurs in RIIO for outputs.  However, 
the public staff process, as explained, provides none of the 
“stability and predictability” they say they want: rate cases are 
set for the same maximum duration as currently, and rate 
plans are subject to being reopened.156  While reopening is 
possible in RIIO, the conditions which would allow reopening 
are specified during the price control review.  REV does not 
seem to be so prescriptive, allowing for unnecessary 
uncertainty.  Proportionate assessment may occur in that 
“high-performing utilities” which meet outcomes will be able to 
extend a rate case to five years; however, this does not impact 
the original or subsequent rate cases or how EIMs are set.  
REV could do more to ensure stability and regulatory certainty 
than is currently proposed. 
The only place where the public staff seems to contemplate 
decreased revenue is in potential changes to the current 
earnings sharing mechanisms (“ESM”).  The ESMs allow the 
utility to retain earnings above the baseline return on equity 
 
152. Id. at 29. 
153. “Utilities, customers and market participants will benefit from the 
stability and predictability of a multi-year plan as REV markets are 
developed. . . . Utilities will be better able to focus on developing DSP 
capabilities and [sic] if they are not diverted into time-consuming and 
contentious rate proceedings.”  Id. at 70. 
154. Id. at 70-71. 
155. Id. at 60. 
156. Id. at 72. 
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and return part of that to its shareholders with the remainder 
going to customers.  However, even with the changes 
contemplated, a utility with inferior outcomes would still 
receive the baseline ROE level.  The shareholders sharing 
additional revenues with customers would only start at that 
baseline level.  This is less draconian—and, therefore, less of a 
disincentive for poor performance—than RIIO’s potential of 
return dropping below the actual cost of debt. 
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
Regulatory reform is happening and will continue, 
potentially more quickly, especially with new federal rules like 
the Clean Power Plan.  New York’s REV process seems to be 
taking some direction from RIIO, but could do more to meet 
enumerated goals.  Rather than reinvent pieces – especially on 
the process side – to meet objectives, New York and other 
states have the ability to move forward more quickly with 
reforms.  Analyzing regulatory frameworks from other 
jurisdictions will enable them to do just that. 
While each of the states continues to find its own way, one 
option to instill performance-based regulation nationally is for 
federal policy to make it a priority.  This could also ensure that 
environmental goals—being implemented with performance-
based metrics in the U.K. and potentially in New York—are 
addressed in energy regulation, something currently 
haphazard at best.157  Requiring environmental goals to be met 
as outputs, with earnings tied to them, should become part a 
larger part of the regulatory landscape in the United States.  
RIIO has shown a viable path forward for that to occur more 
quickly than starting from scratch. 
 
 
157. See Victor B. Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without the Other: 
The Challenge of Integrating U.S. Environment, Energy, Climate and 
Economic Policy, 44 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1079 (2014). 
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